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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kerry A. Howell appeals from the judgment entered upon his conditional
guilty plea to burglary.

On appeal, Howell challenges the denial of his motion to

suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
At approximately 7:00 a.m. on July 14, 2013, Kootenai County Sheriff's
Deputies Howard and Broesch were dispatched to a residential cul-de-sac to
investigate "an anonymous report of two suspicious vehicles." (Tr., 1 p.7, L.7 - p.12,
L.7, p.43, L.14 - p.45, L.5.) Upon arriving at the cul-de-sac, Deputy Howard "came
upon two vehicles," one of which was a pickup truck with a travel trailer attached to
it. (Tr., p.12, Ls.8-24.) Deputy Howard parked his patrol car adjacent to the front
end of the pickup truck, and Deputy Broesch parked his patrol car 10 to 20 feet
behind Deputy Howard's vehicle.

(Tr., p.13, L.7 - p.14, L.8, p.21, Ls.4-11, p.25,

L.25 - p.26, L.17, p.47, Ls.8-20; see generally Exhibits.) Deputy Howard then made
contact with two men who were near the pickup truck, one of whom was Howell.
(Tr., p.9, Ls.22-24, p.14, Ls.9-15, p.32, Ls.16-21.)
Deputy Howard asked Howell and the other man what they were doing in the
cul-de-sac, whether they were broken down, and where they were headed. (Tr.,
p.14, Ls.11-15, p.15, Ls.7-13, p.32, L.25-p.33, L.7.) Howelltoldtheofficerhewas
headed to the Spirit Lake area but was having issues with the trailer and had pulled

All citations herein to "Tr." are to the transcript of the suppression hearing held on
March 4, 2014.
1
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into the cul-de-sac to work on it "and try and solve how it was not trailering
correctly."

(Tr., p.14, Ls.18-21, p.32, L.25 - p.33, L.7.)

Deputy Howard asked

Howell for his driver's license and registration, and Howell complied. (Tr., p.33, L.8
- p.34, L.6, p.34, L.19 - p.35, L.5.)

The registration indicated Howell was the

registered owner of the pickup truck. (Tr., p.34, L.24 - p.35, L.5.) The deputy then
asked Howell whether the trailer belonged to him. (Tr., p.15, Ls.17-21.) Howell said
it did not, but that it belonged to his girlfriend, Kelly Gilbert. {Tr., p.15, L.23 - p.16,
L.10, p.34, Ls.7-9.) When asked whether he had Ms. Gilbert's permission to have
the trailer, Howell told the officer the trailer actually belonged to his sister's
boyfriend.

(Tr., p.16, Ls.15-23.)

Howell, however, could not recall his sister's

boyfriend's name. (Tr., p.16, Ls.23-25, p.17, Ls.8-9.) At that point, Deputy Howard
asked dispatch to run a registration query on the trailer's license plate. (Tr., p.17,
Ls.5-8, p.34, Ls.10-16.) The results of that query showed the trailer "was not owned
[by] or registered to [Howell's] sister or [his] sister's boyfriend.

It was actually

registered to someone totally unrelated to him." (Tr., p.17, Ls.13-23.)
The state charged Howell with grand theft by possession of stolen property
and two counts of burglary. (R., pp.48-49.) Howell filed a motion to suppress the
evidence against him, arguing it was the fruit of an unlawful detention. (R., pp.5253, 68-79.) Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion. (R., pp.11112.) Howell thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of burglary, as
alleged in an amended information, reserving the right on appeal to challenge the
denial of his motion to suppress.

(R., pp.205-11, 213-14.)

The district court

imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, and retained
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jurisdiction.

(R., pp.215-16, 222-23.)

Howell timely appealed from the judgment.

(R., pp.219-21, 232-36.)

3

ISSUE
Howell states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Howell's motion to
suppress the State's evidence?
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Howell failed to show error in the denial of his motion to suppress?

4

ARGUMENT
Howell Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Howell challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing "he was

illegally seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when Officer Howard
took [his] driver's license and registration."

(Appellant's brief, p.6.)

Howell's

argument fails. Correct application of the law to the facts shows the limited seizure
that occurred when Deputy Howard took Howell's license and registration was
reasonable and did not violate Howell's Fourth Amendment rights.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, the appellate court accepts

the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 144
Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).

C.

The Limited Seizure That Occurred When Deputy Howard Took Howell's
Driver's License And Registration Was Reasonable And Did Not Violate
Howell's Fourth Amendment Rights
The

Fourth Amendment to the

United

States Constitution

prohibits

unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. However, not every
police-citizen encounter triggers Fourth Amendment scrutiny.

"A seizure under the

meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs only 'when the officer, by means of
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a

5

citizen."' State v. Nickel, 134 Idaho 610, 612-13, 7 P.3d 219, 221-22 (2000) (quoting
Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)).
"When a defendant seeks to suppress evidence allegedly obtained as a
result of an illegal seizure, the burden of proving that a seizure occurred is on the
defendant." State v. Fuentes, 129 Idaho 830, 832, 933 P.2d 119, 121 (Ct. App.
1997) (citations omitted).

The proper inquiry in determining whether a seizure

occurred is "whether, under all the circumstances surrounding the encounter, a
reasonable person would have felt free to leave or otherwise decline the officer's
requests and terminate the encounter." State v. Reese, 132 Idaho 652, 653, 978
P.2d 212,213 (1999) (citing State v. Fuentes, 129 Idaho 830, 832, 933 P.2d 119,
121 (Ct. App. 1997)). "'So long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard
the police and go about his business,' an encounter between police and an
individual is consensual." Nickel, 134 Idaho at 613, 7 P.3d at 222 (quoting Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991 )).
Applying the above legal principles to the facts of this case, the district court
correctly determined the initial encounter between Howell and the officers was
consensual and did not implicate Howell's Fourth Amendment rights. (Tr., p.62, L.8
- p.65, L.10.)

When the officers arrived in the cul-de-sac, Howell and his

companion were standing outside of their parked vehicles.

(Tr., p.32, Ls.16-21.)

The officers did not activate the lights or sirens on their patrol vehicles and did not
otherwise display any show of force or authority. (Tr., p.13, Ls.7-13, p.32, Ls.22-24,
p.48, Ls.12-16, p.63, Ls.14-17.) The officers parked their vehicles next to Howell's
truck but did not block the truck in or otherwise position their vehicles in a manner
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that would have prevented Howell from driving away. (Tr., p.13, L.7 - p.14, L.8,
p.21, Ls.4-11, p.22, L.8 - p.23, L.2, p.25, L.25 - p.26, L.17, p.29, L.18 - p.30, L. 1,
p.31, Ls.5-9, p.47, Ls.8-20, p.52, L.15 - p.53, L.16, p.63, Ls.4-22; see generally
Exhibits.)

The officers then exited their patrol vehicles and made contact with

Howell, who answered Deputy Howard's questions and voluntarily complied with the
officer's request for his driver's license and registration.

(Tr., p.14, L.11 - p.17,

L.12, p.32, L.25 - p.35, L.5, p.64, Ls.15-22.)
On appeal, Howell does not challenge either the district court's factual
findings or its legal determination that the officers needed no reasonable articulable
suspicion of criminal activity to approach Howell outside of his parked vehicle and
ask him questions.

Rather, Howell contends he was unlawfully seized at the

moment Deputy Howard secured his driver's license and registration because, at
that point, he was not free to leave and the officer had not yet developed any
reasonable suspicion justifying an investigative detention. 2 (Appellant's brief, pp.79.) The state acknowledges that a limited detention occurred when Deputy Howard
took Howell's license and registration. See State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 844, 103
P.3d 454, 457 (2004); State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 493, 826 P.2d 452, 454
(1992); State v. Landreth, 139 Idaho 986, 990-91, 88 P.3d 1226, 1230-31 (Ct. App.
2004); State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 436, 439, 34 P.3d 1119, 1122 (Ct. App. 2001 ).

2

Although Howell raised this issue below (see Tr., p.59, Ls.9-13, p.61, Ls.13-21),
the district court did not specifically address it in its oral ruling denying Howell's
motion to suppress (see Tr., p.62, L.8 - p.65, L.10). The state believes this Court
can resolve the issue by applying the law to the facts testified to at the suppression
hearing. In the event this Court deems additional fact-finding related to this issue
necessary, the state submits the appropriate remedy is to remand the matter to the
district court.
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Contrary to Howell's assertions, however, the fact that the officer took Howell's
documentation did not transform the voluntary encounter into an unlawful seizure.
Rather, under well-established principles of search and seizure, the limited detention
of Howell for the purpose of verifying his identity and registration status was
reasonable and did not violate Howell's constitutional rights.
It is beyond cavil that a police officer may generally ask an individual
questions and may ask for identification.

£&.,

Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 105

S.Ct 308, 83 LEd.2d 165 (1984). A limited detention does occur when an officer
retains a driver's license or other paperwork of value. Godwin, 121 Idaho at 493,
826 P.2d at 454; Landreth, 139 Idaho at 990, 88 P.3d at 1230; Martinez, 136 Idaho
at 439, 34 P.3d at 1122.

However, the Idaho appellate courts have consistently

held that the brief retention of a motorists driver's license or other identifying
paperwork during an otherwise lawful police contact is constitutionally reasonable
because the intrusion upon the person's privacy interest is minimal when compared
to the valid public/governmental interests, including the officer's need to properly
identify the person with whom he is dealing, prepare accurate reports and ensure
officer safety.

Godwin, 121 Idaho at 493-94, 826 P.2d at 454-55; Landreth, 139

Idaho at 990, 88 P.3d at 1230; State v. Reed, 129 Idaho 503, 505-06, 927 P.2d 893,
895-96 (Ct App. 1996); see also Martinez, 136 Idaho at 439, 34 P.3d at 1122
("[T]he police have a strong interest in identifying the individuals they come into
contact with in any capacity."); but see Page, 140 Idaho at 844-45, 103 P.3d at 45758 (public interests that justify taking a driver's license from the operator of an
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automobile regardless of suspicion of criminal activity do not justify the taking of
identification from a pedestrian who is not otherwise suspected of misconduct).
For example, in Landreth, supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that, even
absent any suspicion of criminal activity, an "officer could properly detain Landreth
to run a driver's license check after a legitimate consensual encounter." Landreth,
139 Idaho at 991, 88 P.3d at 1231. The officer in that case was dispatched to a
grocery store parking lot in response to a report of a suspicious vehicle moving from
parking space to parking space.

19.:. At 987, 88 P.3d at 1227. Upon his arrival, the

officer observed the vehicle and observed that an extension cord was running from
the hood of the vehicle to the wall of the grocery store.

19.:. The officer questioned

the driver of the vehicle, Landreth, about his identity and purpose at the grocery
store and also asked him for identification.

19.:. When Landreth produced his driver's

license, the officer relayed the "pertinent information" to dispatch and dispatch, in
turn, advised the officer that Landreth had an outstanding arrest warrant.

19.:. The

officer arrested Landreth on the warrant and, in a search incident to that arrest,
found methamphetamine, marijuana and drug paraphernalia.

1st

In the prosecution that followed, Landreth moved to suppress the evidence
obtained during the search incident to arrest, "claiming that his brief detention while
the officer ran a driver's query violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures."

kl

the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed.

19.:. at 987-91, 88 P.3d at 1227-31. Citing

The district court denied the motion, and

Godwin, supra, the Court of Appeals recognized "[t]he Idaho Supreme Court has
determined that a police officer's brief detention of a driver to run a status check on
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the driver's license, after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment." Landreth, 139 Idaho at 990, 88 P.3d at
1230 (citing Godwin, 121 Idaho at 495, 826 P.2d at 456.) Although a limited seizure
occurs when an officer takes a motorist's license, "substantial public interests,
including the officer's need to positively identify the person with whom he [is]
dealing, outweigh[] the minimal police intrusion."

~

(citing Godwin, 121 Idaho at

495-96, 826 P.2d at 456-57). Moreover, "the Idaho statute authorizing officers to
demand display of a driver's license, I.C. 49-316, includes the authority to run a
status check on the license."

~

(citing Godwin, 121 Idaho at 495-96, 826 P.2d at

456-57).
Applying Godwin to the facts before it, the Court of Appeals concluded
Landreth was not unlawfully detained when the officer took his driver's license and
ran his information through dispatch.

Because "Landreth was already stopped in

the parking lot and willingly spoke with the officer," the contact to the point the officer
took Landreth's driver's license was a valid, consensual encounter. Landreth, 139
Idaho at 991, 88 P.3d at 1231. Because, under Godwin, "an officer's brief detention
of a driver to run a status check on the driver's license, after making a valid, lawful
contact with the driver, is reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment," the
Court of Appeals held the brief detention of Landreth to run a status check on his
~

driver's license was constitutionally reasonable.

In so holding, the Court

cautioned its decision did "not countenance officers initiating 'consensual contacts'
with individuals merely in order to follow that contact with a request for identification
to run a license check or a warrants check."
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Such was not a concern in

Landreth's case, however, because "the officer had a legitimate reason to make
contact with Landreth, even though that reason may not have amounted to
reasonable suspicion that would have justified a detention at the outset of the
encounter." lg_,_
In this case, as in Landreth, Deputy Howard had a legitimate reason to make
contact with Howell. The deputy had received a report of "two suspicious vehicles"
in a residential cul-de-sac.

Following up on that report, the officer made lawful

contact with Howell, who was standing in the cul-de-sac near his parked vehicle and
willingly answered the officer's questions. During the consensual encounter, Deputy
Howard asked Howell for his driver's license and registration, and Howell complied
with that request. As in Landreth and Godwin,

the officer in this case clearly had a

legitimate public interest in confirming Howell's identity. And, as in Landreth and
Godwin, the retention of Howell's driver's license and registration for this purpose,
during an otherwise valid consensual encounter, constituted a minimal intrusion
upon Howell's privacy interests and was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Howell has failed to show any basis for reversal of the denial of his motion to
suppress. 3

Howell concedes that, after Deputy Howard took his driver's license and
registration, the officers "developed reasonable suspicion that [he] might have been
in possession of stolen property." (See Appellant's brief, pp.8-9 (citing 3/4/14 Tr.,
p.64, Ls.15-22 (district court's finding that officers developed reasonable suspicion
while questioning Howell)); compare with 3/4/14 Tr., p.15, L.21 - p.17, L.12, p.33,
L.8 - p.34, L.9 (after Deputy Howard took Howell's license, Howell gave inconsistent
stories about who owned the trailer).)
3
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and the
district court's order denying Howell's motion to suppress.
DATED this 5th day of April 2015.

I A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney G

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of April 2015, served a true and
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
SHAWN F. WILKERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

I A. FLEMIN
Deputy Attorney
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